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The expansion of off-the-shelf or civilianized UAS platforms presents
unique opportunities for criminal or terrorist exploitation of UAS systems.
According to the U.S. Department of State (2006), terrorists are adept at
weaponizing technology not originally designed for destructive purposes.
Terrorists utilize current technology in both conventional and unconventional
means to inflict terror and achieve mass effects (U.S. Department of State, 2006).
Such fears are not merely hypothetical. In December 2013, German
Chancellor Angela Merkel attended an outdoor campaign rally in Dresden (Naim,
2013). While on the podium, a small quadcopter crash-landed on the platform next
to Merkel and her colleagues (Naim, 2013). Fortunately for Merkel, the UAS stunt
was operated by members of the rival Pirate Party and merely flown to make a
political statement against the nation’s use of unmanned craft for security (Naim,
2013). Not surprisingly, experts were quick to point out the potential security
implications of the incident, citing the potential for drones to be outfitted with
weapons or explosives. This incident was a wakeup call for global security
agencies—civilian use of unmanned vehicles presents new potential threats to
public security.
This incident came as no surprise to U.S. law enforcement agencies, as only
two years prior, a terrorist plot involving UAS craft was thwarted by the Federal
Bureau of Investigation. In 2011, 26-year old Rezwan Ferdaus was arrested for
plotting an attack on the Pentagon and Capital buildings using a remotely controlled
aircraft containing C-4 explosives (“Feds,” 2011; “Model,” 2011). Ferdaus planned
to fly three miniature, jet-powered models packed with a combined 15 pounds of
C-4 and direct the explosive-laden craft at the target buildings (“Model,” 2011). A
similar plot was foiled in 2015 when El Mehdi Semlali Fahti was caught for plotting
to attack a school and federal building using remote-controlled aircraft equipped
with improvised explosive devices (Brandon, 2014). Fahti detailed how he would
obtain the explosive materials and indicated the plot would be funded through drug
profits and money laundering (Brandon, 2014).
Despite its successes in thwarting previous UAS plots, law enforcement
efforts continue to show vulnerabilities to potential UAS threats. In January 2015,
an allegedly drunken Geospatial Intelligence Agency employee lost control of his
friend’s small quadcopter UAS in the heart of Washington D.C. (Shear & Schmidt,
2015). Unbeknownst to him, the small craft had overflown the White House
perimeter fence and crashed on the presidential residence lawn (Shear & Schmidt,
2015). The drone was reportedly sighted by an on-duty law enforcement officer,
but went undetected by the White House’s aerial defense radar (Shear & Schmidt,
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2015). While this incident was unintentional, it further exemplifies the
vulnerabilities against a potential UAS threat.
Drones continue to circumvent traditional security efforts. In yet another
incident, a small drone was found on the roof of Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo
Abe’s office in Tokyo (“Drone,” 2015). Initially, Japanese investigators reported
not knowing who was responsible for the incident (“Drone,” 2015). Most alarming,
however, was the discovery that the UAS craft was marked with radioactive
symbols, carried a plastic bottle with unidentifiable contents, and registered trace
levels of radiation (“Drone,” 2015).
Problem
Law enforcement and security agencies have demonstrated they are illprepared to combat ever-growing UAS threats. Because of the novelty of UAS
systems, potential UAS threats are poorly understood by law enforcement and
security personnel. Moreover, there is currently no cohesive defense strategy in
which to systematically counter UAS threats.
Purpose
This study sought to identify potential uses and adaptations of UAS systems
as weapons of terrorism or crime by establishing a cumulative list of generic,
intentional and unlawful uses of UAS systems. The study also sought to propose a
recommended model of defenses, countermeasures, and mitigation strategies
against illicit UAS employment or attacks.
Definitions
For the purposes of this research study, the following definitions were used:
Political scientist David Rapoport (2008) codifies terrorism as
Terror is violence with distinctive properties used for political purposes
both by private parties and states. That violence is unregulated by publicly
accepted norms to contain violence, the rules of war, and the rules of
punishment. Private groups using terror most often disregard the rules of
war, while state terror generally disregards legally codified rules of
punishment, i.e. those enabling us to distinguish guilt from innocence, but
both states and non-state groups can ignore either set of rules. (footnote 12).
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According to the Merriam-Webster Dictionary (n.d.), crime is defined as
(1) An act or the commission of an act that is forbidden or the omission of
a duty that is commanded by a public law that makes the offender liable to
punishment by that law. (p. 1)
Method
This study utilized qualitative, Conceptual Analysis methodology.
According to Petocz and Newberry (2010) Conceptual Analysis is “the analysis of
concepts, terms, variables, constructs, definitions, assertions, hypotheses, and
theories. It involves examining these for clarity and coherence, critically
scrutinizing their logical relations, and identifying assumptions and implications”
(p. 126).
Academic research articles, unclassified government reports, and opensource news articles were assessed to identify recurring themes related to the
targeting, employment, adaptations, and defenses against UAS threats. Thematic
trends were categorized and coded to model illicit UAS employment methods and
evaluate systematic defense mechanisms.
The study sought to discover answers to the following research questions:
1. How are UAS systems used for illegal purposes or terrorism?
2. What are current defense methods against UAS threats?
Articles were selected using an internet search engine with Boolean search
pattern for five preselected search combinations, which included nine unique
permutations of terms: UAS/UAV/drone and Terrorism, Threat, and Malicious
Use. Articles were assessed for thematic concepts. Researchers established a
thematic concepts list for each of the topical areas: illegal/terroristic UAS
methodology and UAS defense measures or systems. Articles, which presented
unique or original concepts, were added to the respective thematic concept list.
Repeating or recurring concepts were annotated according to each concept theme.
Some articles contained only a single concept while others contained multiple
concepts. Whenever possible, concepts were generalized to fit within the coding
system, so long as the generalization did not compromise unique concept findings.
Collection of data continued until it was clear that researchers could not derive
additional unique concepts from further data analysis—in other words, concept
saturation was reached.
Upon completion of data collection, the researchers evaluated each of the
thematic concept lists for similar themes and attempted to further generalize
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thematic concepts. For each thematic concept list, the researchers evaluated the
content area and data to select an appropriate conceptual presentation model.
This research specifically excluded UAS applications by military, state
entities, recognized governments, or state-sponsored terrorism. Additionally,
articles dated prior to 2005 were withdrawn from the data to ensure study currency
and validity.
Results and Discussion
Researchers evaluated 68 academic studies, unclassified government
reports, and news articles. An analysis of the recurring conceptual themes yielded
the following results.
Terrorism and Criminal Use of UAS Platforms
As the United States moves closer to fully integrating unmanned aerial
systems (UAS) into the national airspace the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) has much work to do in terms of regulations, training, licensing and other
related issues for a successful integration of the technology for commercial and
societal benefits. The FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, among its
many sections, charged the FAA in Subtitle B, Sections 331 through 336 –
Unmanned Aircraft Systems, to accomplish a safe integration of UAS into domestic
airspace (U.S. Government Publishing Office, 2012). Much controversy over the
actual implementation and introduction of UAS into the airspace has the FAA
behind the curve in establishing legal and regulatory guidelines. While UAS
platforms promise to offer new opportunities, they simultaneously present new
security threats.
The nefarious aspects of UAS have moved from concept to reality. Before
UAS have been lawfully vetted and licensed for legitimate uses, certain actors have
been busying themselves with the criminal aspect and application of UAS. Such
incidences present a foreshadowing of possible terrorist scenarios that provide
homeland security officials with a glimpse of terror threats looming on the horizon.
We must remain vigilant for unexpected methods for the deployment of terror by
our adversaries. The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks on the United
States (2004) cited four types of failures regarding the protection of the homeland.
Chief among the failures was imagination. The report went on to say,
America stood out as an object for admiration, envy, and blame. This
created a kind of cultural asymmetry. To us, Afghanistan seemed very far

https://commons.erau.edu/ijaaa/vol2/iss4/1
DOI: https://doi.org/10.15394/ijaaa.2015.1084

4

Wallace and Loffi: Examining UAS Threats & Defenses: A Conceptual Analysis

away. To members of al Qaeda, America seemed very close. In a sense, they
were more globalized than we were. (p. 340).
As al Qaeda was more globalized then – terrorists remain shrewd with current
technology now and UAS is no exception. Some have questioned and even
criticized officials for considering UAS as a legitimate method for state and nonstate actors to spread terror. In a 2012 article, Wayne Morse, president of American
Dynamic Flight Systems alluded that for terrorists to consider the use of UAS as a
means for terror was unlikely and they [terrorists] could simply achieve a better
result from suicide bombings. The article goes on to call this a myth in the making
and politicians will use the concept of UAS as a terror weapon as a political tool
(Gosztola, 2012). Could this be further evidence of a lack of imagination if the illicit
use of UAS is dismissed as not feasible or practical?
In August 2015 the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) placed law
enforcement officials in America on notice regarding the use of UAS as a means
for terror. In their assessment release DHS said, “We cannot rule [out] the ability
of future adversaries to acquire and use a commercially available [drone] as part of
an attack within the Homeland" (“DHS,” 2015, para. 5).
Further evidence exists for the use of UAS as a terror weapon. In October
2014, the New York City Police Department (NYPD) publicly reported concern
about an air assault by UAS (“NYPD,” 2014). The technology involved in the
manufacture of UAS is such that it should be considered as a potential terror threat.
The NYPD police commissioner cited examples of videos showing UAS accurately
striking targets with a paintball gun. NYPD is especially concerned about the
capability of UAS to carry a payload of explosives to a designated target. The
commissioner cites the video, which disclosed a UAV hovering and landing in front
of the lectern at a public speaking event conducted by Germany’s Chancellor
Angela Merkel. Had the UAS been carrying a payload of explosives it would have
threatened the lives of those in close proximity to the UAS. Such examples reiterate
the varied potential for illicit UAS use. To defend against UAS threats, one must
first understand the nature of the threat.
Commercial off the Shelf Threat
As in most instances of manufacturing, the technology typically outpaces
regulations and laws. This is especially true with the manufacture and use of UAS.
The nature of commercial UAS technology makes it exploitable for criminal or
terroristic purposes directly out of the box, with little modification.
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Figure 1. Concepts of Illicit UAS Use.

Nuisance. The most benign illicit use of UAS platforms is the interference
they create for the general public. Such actions represent any interference with a
property owner’s rights to use and enjoy their property without substantial or
unreasonable interference (Soloman, 2014). Similarly, UAS platforms may violate
an individual’s privacy, sometimes referred to as “intentional intrusion upon
seclusion,” measured by the standard of whether a normal person would be
offended by the invasion (Soloman, 2014). The aforementioned behaviors are
reflected in civil or tort law. A more serious infraction caused by a drone is
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trespassing, or the illegal intrusion onto someone else’s property (Soloman, 2014).
Trespassing is encompassed in both criminal and civil law. Nuisance threats go well
beyond mere irritation. A UAS could potentially upset children or animals on an
individual’s property.
In a recent wildlife physiology study published in the Journal of Biology,
researchers found that large predators, when exposed to drones, can incur
cardiovascular stress (Viegas, 2015). In the study, researchers exposed wild bears
to short, 5-minute encounters with a flying UAS platform and discovered that the
animals' heart rates spiked by up to 400% (Viegas, 2015). Furthermore, drones can
elicit fear or adversely affect an individual’s perceptions of security or safety. In
May 2015, several residents of Del Mar, California, became concerned about a
drone that had been spotted numerous times outside the windows of their homes
(Chambers, 2015). Despite the fact the drone was not equipped with a camera or
monitoring device, it unnerved local residents, as no one knew who was flying the
craft and why it was being operated in the middle of the night (Chambers, 2015).
The operator, who was later identified, claimed “there’s nothing to worry about…I
just like flying this [drone]” (Chambers, 2015, p. 1).
Monitoring Threat. One of the most notable concerns about UAS
platforms stems from their potential to silently monitor and record their
surroundings. Culturally, U.S. citizens tend to be abhorrent to unchecked domestic
surveillance, legitimate or otherwise. This attitude is readily apparent, evidenced
by the public outcry and subsequent clamor for reform of the recent National
Security Agency warrantless wiretapping and similar incidents. One might argue
that aerial surveillance is not a new threat – anyone with a pilot certificate and
access to an aircraft has the capability of conducting aerial surveillance.
Surveillance. UAS platforms, however, change the dynamic of aerial
surveillance, making it accessible and affordable for almost anyone. With the
availability of highly automated UAS hobby platforms such as the DJI Phantom,
one can purchase a relatively sophisticated aerial monitoring platform with highresolution capability. Newswire stories of such privacy intrusions by UAS
platforms are becoming more commonplace. In August 2015, a Hawaii resident
spotted an unmanned rotorcraft hovering outside her bedroom window, yet law
enforcement was unable to respond as the action violated no established criminal
laws (Kawano, 2015). A similar incident occurred in Kentucky, when a concerned
father disabled a drone caught observing his young daughters in their backyard, yet
again, police efforts were curtailed since no laws had been broken (Chappell, 2015).
Perhaps more frightening is the unknown purpose behind many hobby drone
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flights. While many operators are merely enjoying their UAS devices, others may
have more sinister observation intentions, such as observing young children.
Reconnaissance. While similar to surveillance, reconnaissance activities
take a further step toward illicit behavior. Often confused with surveillance,
reconnaissance is an activity derived from military terminology that involves
collecting intelligence on a known "enemy" target. To illustrate, consider the
example of a criminal seeking to burglarize a house. Surveillance would be the
actions taken to observe various neighborhood properties; whereas, reconnaissance
involves scoping out a specific property for exploitable weaknesses, such as
security, homeowner arrival and departure times, possible entry locations, and other
related "intelligence" information. Unmanned systems have the capability of
performing both surveillance and reconnaissance functions. An assessment by the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) indicated drug dealers and drug cartels
were already beginning to use UAS platforms to monitor police activities along the
U.S. border (Levine, 2015). Moreover, UAS automation allows operators to
conduct illicit monitoring activities at a sizable standoff distance, effectively
preserving their anonymity from potential criminal investigation. Such illicit
monitoring actions allow criminals or terrorists to assess for vulnerabilities in
critical infrastructure, government sites, businesses, and private citizens alike.
Airspace Interference. UAS platforms present a genuine threat to safe
airspace utilization. The FAA has logged dozens of reports of near-misses between
airliners and UAS platforms being improperly operated near airports across the
country. In March 2014, a US Airways regional jet nearly collided with a small
UAS near Tallahassee, Florida (Whitlock, 2014). September of the same year,
Republic Airlines reported nearly striking a small unmanned craft at 4,000 feet.
Also in September 2014, three different airlines inbound to LaGuardia reported
successive encounters with a UAS operating along the final approach path
(Whitlock, 2014). In addition to interfering with normal aviation operations,
unmanned aerial vehicles are impeding emergency response functions. In August
2015, a SkyLife helicopter came within 20 feet of being struck by a smallunmanned platform while transporting a patient (Ybarra, 2015). This incident
comes just one month after California aerial firefighting teams encountered five
hobbyist-operated UAS craft obscured by smoke near a wildfire operation. Fire
crews temporarily suspended aerial fire suppression operations for safety while the
law enforcement personnel attempted to remove the drones from the area
(Martinez, 2015). An airborne UAS creates a collision threat to aircraft and could
adversely impact normal and emergency aviation operations. It is conceivable that
terrorists or criminals could employ UAS craft to disrupt drug interdiction, law
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enforcement, or medical aircraft with the intended purpose of curtailing tracking,
emergency response, or disaster mitigation capabilities.
Kinetic/Kamikaze. Even without armaments, a drone is capable of causing
damage or injury to people or property on the ground or in the air. While many
UAS accidents are likely accidental rather than intentional, the risk is the same. In
March 2015, a small UAS hobby platform crashed into a Miami home, breaking a
window. Since the drone went unclaimed and police were unable to determine the
identity of the operator, the property owner had little recourse to recover damages
(“Mystery,” 2015). In a more serious event in July 2015, a woman was knocked
unconscious by a falling UAS platform after its owner lost control of the device at
a Seattle gay pride parade (Rawlinson, 2015). To exemplify the potential kinetic
lethality of unmanned vehicles, one can simply turn to a gruesome 2003 event in
which 13-year old Tara Lipscombe was struck in the head by an out of control RC
aircraft (Allen, 2003). Flying at 50 mph, the 5-foot wide aircraft delivered a lethal
blow to the young girl, who died merely three hours after the incident (Allen, 2003).
While the aforementioned incidents appear unintentional, they exemplify the lethal
potential of UAS systems. Should criminal or terrorist elements wish to carry out
an attack, an out-of-the-box UAS platform has the potential to deliver a lethal
kinetic blow to soft targets, while having the potential added benefit of appearing
as accidental or negligent.

Figure 2. Damage caused by small prototype, fixed-wing UAS against a parked static aircraft.
While this accident was inadvertent, the incurred damage demonstrates the kinetic destructive
potential of UAS platforms (Used with permission).
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Payload Threat/Smuggling. UAS platforms can also be exploited as a
transportation mechanism for illegal contraband or cargo. Use of these platforms
allow terrorists or criminals to bypass traditional security barriers such as fences,
walls, and detection measures. Essentially, drones add a skyward dimension to
security considerations. The New York Times reported an incident occurring in
Bishopville, South Carolina at the Lee Correctional Institution where a UAS was
spotted by prison officials flying from a wooded area near the prison toward the
perimeter of the institution (Schmidt, 2015). A guard reported seeing a man running
away from the wooded area. Later prison officials found a package left by the UAS,
which contained a cellphone, tobacco, and marijuana. The package had become
tangled in the power lines near the prison and the crashed remains of a UAS were
located nearby. The director of the South Carolina Department of Corrections stated
it appeared to be a delivery system (Schmidt, 2015). A similar incident occurred in
Tijuana in April 2015. A hexicopter carrying 7 pounds of methamphetamines
operating just two miles from the U.S.-Mexico border crashed into a shopping
center parking lot (Davis, 2015). The incident marks a novel approach to drug
smuggling that law enforcement officials call an emerging threat (Davis, 2015).
Weaponized Threat. Perhaps the most fearsome threat produced by
terrorist or criminal entities involve the deliberate construction or modification of
UAS systems to carry and employ weapons. This application of UAS platforms has
received the bulwark of speculation and even fear mongering among industry
experts, but is well-justified considering the relative ease in which a UAS platform
can be weaponized to produce devastating results. Wilkinson (2012) explains,
"Terrorists have demonstrated repeatedly that their goals and objectives can be
accomplished by using the same tactics and 'off-the-shelf' weapons (though
cleverly modified or adapted to their needs) that they have traditionally relied upon”
(p. 23). Armaments that can be added to UAS platforms vary widely from juryrigged incendiary or explosive devices to carefully engineered projectile systems.
Non-Lethal Systems. While the use of non-lethal systems are not generally
associated with criminal activity, the production of such systems is already
underway for law enforcement and security purposes. Mounting a drone with
systems capable of firing rubber bullets, tear gas, or taser nodes has several
promising applications for law enforcement organizations (Kersey, 2012). In
March 2014, the technology company Chaotic Moon successfully armed a UAS
with an 80,000-volt Taser and test fired the weapon on a volunteer from the
company. Called the Chaotic Unmanned Personal Intercept Drone (CUPID), the
experimental device was controlled by a smart phone, with further automated
features currently under development (Metro, 2014). It is not unreasonable to
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speculate that terrorist or criminal elements could foreseeably gain access to such
systems through either proliferation or theft.
Projectile Threats. While the prospect of UAS platforms carrying firearms
or other lethal projectile weapons might seem particularly troubling, the likelihood
of such a modification is reasonably low compared to other weaponization efforts.
The development of an effective projectile weapon system such as a gun or missile
requires highly specialized engineering and fabrication expertise. Without
engineering expertise, access to these types of UAS systems is generally limited to
a select group of special operations or military organizations. Moreover, such
technology generally remains tightly guarded against physical theft or proliferation,
making the acquisition of such systems by terrorists or criminal elements extremely
improbable. Despite the aforementioned complications, some individuals have selfproduced UAS projectile systems that show alarming ingenuity. In June 2015 an
18-year old mechanical engineering student equipped his UAS with a semiautomatic pistol and successfully fired the weapon while his UAS was airborne
(Kerley, 2015). Local and federal authorities were investigating the incident to
determine if any criminal statutes had been violated.
IED/Explosive. The use of drones as a delivery system for improvised
explosive devices (IEDs), incendiary devices, or other combustibles remains high.
Terrorists in particular have shown great ingenuity in crafting rudimentary
explosives. According to Wilkinson (2012), "Relying on unconventional
adaptations or modifications to conventional explosive devices, these [terrorist]
organizations have been able to develop innovative and devastatingly effective
means to conceal, deliver, and detonate all kinds of bombs" (p. 19). Dolnik (2007)
further explains that some terrorist groups are already considering the benefits of a
UAS delivery system, "Terrorists in Kashmir have experimented with remotecontrol model planes and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) to deliver explosives
from the air" (p. 45). The 2011 plot by Rezwan Ferdaus to use remote control
aircraft to deliver and detonate explosives against the U.S. Capital building and
Pentagon show that terrorists already consider UAS platforms as a viable method
of weapon delivery ("Model," 2011).
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). Weapons of mass destruction
represent particularly lethal threats stemming from the use of hazardous materials
including Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) substances.
Use of UAS platforms as a delivery system for CBRN substances are particularly
troublesome, as such delivery systems could easily bypass traditional security
measures. Moreover, such systems can effectively cause mass casualties without
the need for precision flying. A drone could merely over-fly the target area where
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a CBRN substance could be deployed in aerosol form or a dispensing mechanism
dropped from the craft. One such plot by the al-Qaeda terrorist organization was
foiled in 2013 by Iraqi military intelligence personnel ("Iraq," 2013). The
organization planned to employ remote control aircraft to release chemicals
including sarin gas, mustard gas, and chlorine bombs ("Iraq," 2013). According to
U.S. officials, these substances were selected to enhance the lethality of the planned
attack ("Iraq," 2013).
Conversely, some experts argue that CBRN substances are less likely to be
used by terrorist organizations. Davis et al. (2014) notes that WMD substances are
less than ideal for terrorist use, as they are difficult to weaponize and generally
produce fewer casualties than traditional explosives. Davis et al. (2014) further
explains that radiological or nuclear substances in particular pose as much threat to
terrorists as the general public and that the prolonged exposure required to
weaponize a radiological threat would likely be fatal to the instigator. Nevertheless,
the 2015 incident in which a drone landed on the roof of the Japanese Prime
Minister's office emphasizes the reality of such threats. The canister carried by the
drone was believed to contain a radioactive Cesium compound ("Drone laced,"
2015).
Electronic Attack. A particularly novel threat presented by drones is the
potential to use them as platforms to commit an electronic attack or electronic theft.
The SensePost "Snoopy" UAV can be equipped to digitally hijack a smart phone's
wireless signal and gain access to personal information contained on the device
(Gittleson, 2014). Snoopy developer Glenn Wilkerson alludes that any Wi-Fienabled device is vulnerable to the Snoopy system. He further describes how the
Snoopy system can impersonate a Wi-Fi trusted network and even exploit the
phone's unique MAC address to track its location (Gittleson, 2014). Wilkerson goes
on to explain that the mobility of the device allows it to bypass traditional security
measures and simultaneously maintain stealth (Gittleson, 2014). The device bears
a striking similarity to the Stingray phone tracking system, with substantially
enhanced capabilities. It is conceivable that such technology would be highly
sought-after by intelligence agencies and law enforcement entities and could be
easily adapted by unscrupulous elements to be used for identity theft, blackmail,
corporate espionage, or any number of other illicit activities.
UAS Defense Concepts
Analysis of the data revealed 39 unique UAS defense concepts, however,
articles only offered a limited array of pragmatic defense options. In no instance
was a grand strategy or cumulative protection model presented to cope with UAS
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threats. Defense concepts were assessed and organized into a cumulative defensein-depth model. Viega and McGraw (2002) (as cited in Barnum, Gegick, &
Michael, 2005) assert, “The idea behind defense in depth is to manage risk with
diverse defensive strategies so that if one layer of defense turns out to be
inadequate, another layer of defense will hopefully prevent a full breach” (p. 1).
Schneier (2000) (as cited in Barnum et al., 2005) also supports this notion, stating,
“Don’t rely on single solutions. Use multiple complementary security products so
that a failure in one does not mean total insecurity” (p. 1). This concept is used as
a staple throughout security industry to protect people and assets.
Organization of the data into a defense in depth model for UAS threats
yielded a five-layer, concentric circle of defense which included the following
broad defense strategies: Prevention, Deterrence, Denial, and Detection. The fifth
and final layer of defense was split into diverging subcategories of Interruption and
Destruction.

Figure 3. UAS Defense in Depth Model.

Prevention. Perhaps the most important layer of UAS defense lies in
preventing a UAS attack. The bulwark of preventing UAS threats is credited to the
intelligence community. Preemptive law enforcement investigation and
intelligence collection efforts have often been the singular mechanism that
interrupts dangerous terrorist and criminal plots. According to Lele and Mishra
(2009),
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Existing air defense systems are ineffective against terrorist miniUAVs…this is where the challenge exists for the state. The main effort of
dealing with the threat of terrorist UAVs needs to be on preventative
measures. Under such circumstances, the role of actionable intelligence
[emphasis added] becomes very important. (p. 61).
The unraveling of the 2011 Rezwan Ferdaus plot to fly three remotely-controlled
aircraft into the Pentagon and Capital buildings exemplifies the importance of
intelligence intervention. After being tipped off by a cooperative witness,
undercover FBI agents used traditional surveillance, undercover operations, and
other intelligence and investigative methods to discover and thwart Ferdaus’
planned drone attack (“Affidavit,” 2011; Kimery, 2015).
Supplementing intelligence and preemptive investigative activities, is the
establishment of critical component purchase monitoring. Jackson, Frelinger,
Lostumbo and Button (2008) suggest the establishment of purchase monitoring and
reporting programs for distributors of UAS components or related technologies to
report suspicious customer behavior or questionable purchase patterns (Jackson et
al., 2008). The authors also call for enhanced counter-proliferation programs to
curtail adversary access to heavy payload or long-range UAS platforms (Jackson et
al., 2008). The Government Accountability Office (GAO) echoed the call for
further proliferation controls, citing an increased U.S. vulnerability to terrorist
intelligence gathering or attacks if adversary organizations acquire unmanned
systems (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2012).
Deterrence. The second layer of UAS threat defense lies in the deterrence
of UAS attacks. Data overwhelmingly indicated the need for enhanced legislation
to curtail illegal or terroristic UAS activities. The legislative remedy to counter
UAS threats comes in two basic mechanisms. The first mechanism relies on
legislation to create, establish, and most-importantly, fund various formal UAS
defense measures by equipping agencies to develop and deploy a concerted UAS
defense. The second category of legislative remedy lies in the establishment of civil
and criminal penalties to deter illegal UAS use. Wright (2010) suggests that the
deterrent effect of legal punishments is based on two distinct factors: the certainty
of punishment and the severity of punishment. According to Wright, if people were
certain they would be apprehended for committing a crime, most would likely not
do so (Wright, 2010). Unfortunately, the deterrent effect is almost negated if the
risk of getting arrested, convicted, and punished is negligible (Wright, 2010).
Severity of punishment also plays a role in deterrence, if the offending subject is
aware of the rules and consequences and subsequently makes a rational cost-benefit
analysis of committing the offense (Wright, 2010).
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The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has done little to capitalize on
the deterrent effect of either principle. In fact, even established corporations are
breaking the rules. Peter Sosnowski, a preconstruction director for Webcor Builders
comments about his company’s overt, illegal commercial use of drones stating:
“Officially [the FAA’s] stance is, You can’t do that [fly drones for commercial
use]…until someone gets caught and penalized, drone businesses will continue to
do business as is” (Nicas, 2015, p. 1). The FAA’s use of Cease and Desist letters
and civil penalties are proving relatively ineffective in deterring illegal drone use.
If the FAA cannot keep seemingly law-abiding businesses in line, it is unlikely
established penalties will have any hope of deterring a committed criminal or
terrorist.
In addition to legislative deterrence, several articles suggested the
implementation of No Fly Zones as an additional deterrent against illegal use of
UAS platforms in sensitive areas. In many ways, no fly zones are equally as
ineffective as legal deterrent measures, with the exception that such areas are
usually manned with other physical or active security measures. While deterrence
plays a role in UAS defense, the effectiveness of this security layer relies on the
compliance of UAS operators. In the event of terrorism or criminal activity,
deterrent measures should be considered relatively ineffective.
Denial. The third layer of UAS threat defense encompasses all passive
security measures to thwart the use or effectiveness of drones in conducting illegal
activities or terrorism. Passive security measures provide an ideal security
mechanism for averting UAS threats, since many such measures are inexpensive
and relatively easy to implement with advanced planning. Perhaps the most
important denial measure is the protected asset’s physical environment. Selection
of a location that presents hazards or impediments to UAS operations can
dramatically enhance security against UAS threats. Large trees or high structures
can make controlling or maneuvering a UAS difficult. Moreover, the presence of
such obstacles can also make the likely vector of inbound UAS threats more
predictable. In many cases, obstacles can limit the type of UAS platforms that can
be employed; confined spaces surrounded by tall obstacles for example denies the
ease of approach and maneuverability for fixed wing platforms.
In the event obstacles are not available in the venue area, man-made
obstacles such as nets can be deployed to thwart UAS operations (Chuter, 2015).
The selection of an indoor venue provides further security from UAS threats, as it
provides a physical barrier and obfuscates the exact location of the target from an
external UAS attack. Even adverse weather can provide mitigation from a UAS
attack, as high winds, limited visibility, precipitation, and other atmospheric factors
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can adversely affect UAS controllability or performance, particularly for small
platforms.
A critical sub-component of denial lies in the use of unpredictability, often
called random security measures. Terrorists usually prepare attacks according to a
carefully executed planning cycle that includes: broad target selection, intelligence
gathering and surveillance, specific target selection, pre-attack surveillance and
planning, rehearsals, actions on the objective [attack], and culminates with escape
and exploitation (U.S. Army Training & Doctrine Command, 2003). Ensuring
unpredictability in security through the use of random security measures interrupts
the terrorism planning cycle by denying the adversary critical intelligence and
surveillance information. According to Card (2014), unpredictable security
measures such as varying transport routes and schedules “make it harder for all
terrorists to target high-risk personnel, not just against possible UAV attacks, and
it is recommended these measures continue to be used” (Card, 2014, p. 26). The
importance of unpredictability and random security measures cannot be understated
when defending against UAS threats.
Another proposed mechanism of UAS threat denial is the encoding of UAS
navigation software to prevent UAS use in certain designated areas. Called “geofencing,” this approach is coded in the hardware by the UAS manufacturers to
prevent the craft from operating within the confines of pre-established virtual
boundaries. Drone producer DJI currently uses geo-fencing to prevent its drones
from operating in the Washington D.C. area and around airports (Gettinger, 2015).
Detection. In the event passive defense mechanisms fail to prevent, deter,
or deny a UAS threat, active defense mechanisms must be employed. The
employment of weapons or other active defense means requires rapid detection or
early warning of the UAS, identification of the threat, and subsequent telemetry
tracking to perform an engagement. Several varieties of emerging technologies
have been developed to fulfill this security requirement.
Active detection. Active detection mechanisms involve the use of radar
signals produced by a transmitting device to reflect off a UAS and be detected by
the radar receiver. Conventional radar has significant difficulty detecting and
tracking small UAS craft. First, small UAS craft have very small cross-sections—
the surface area that reflects radar signals. This small surface area results in a
smaller reflectivity of the radar signal, which reduces the probability that the radar
return signal strength will exceed the radar’s detection threshold. Secondly, most
radar systems are equipped with computer or operator-assigned detection
thresholds that further filter out spurious radar returns such as wildlife,
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precipitation, or other non-relevant information. Without such radar filtering
systems, operators would have difficulty determining the difference between an
aerial contact and clutter. Despite these operational challenges, some radar experts
have achieved success in overcoming UAS detection difficulties. Thales Nederland
has configured its Squire multipurpose radar system to detect UAS systems
(Chuter, 2015). In Chuter (2015), Thales sensor development expert Wilm Shuttert
highlighted the capabilities of the new system,
Detection is not the issue. Everybody can detect an object. The big trick is
discriminating small UAVs from birds. We have invested a lot in
developing the algorithms to detect and discriminate a UAV from birds
smaller than a blackbird (p. 1).
Thales’ success reveals that with modification, radar systems can be configured to
detect and track UAS systems. Further study of radar modifications is
recommended to determine their false alarm rate to wildlife.
Passive detection. Passive detection systems use sensors that sample the
electromagnetic spectrum within certain wavelengths to determine the presence of
UAS-characteristic signals. Passive UAS detection systems currently include
visual, acoustic, thermal/infrared, and UAS communications/control frequencies
(Beaudoin, Gademer, Avanthey, Germain, & Vittori, 2015).
Visual detection of UAS platforms is perhaps the simplest method of
detection. Several factors can affect the visual detection of UAS platforms
including: distance of the UAS, the ambient illumination of the UAS, atmospheric
clarity, color and contrast of the UAS, position of the UAS within the field of view,
focus of the eye, and visual fatigue (“Aviation,” n.d.). Visual detection is further
complicated by individual physiological limitations or visual degradation caused
by drugs, alcohol or other vision-degrading substances (“Aviation,” n.d.). Finally,
visual detection can also be adversely affected by a number of visual illusions
(“Aviation,” n.d.).
UAS platforms can also be detected by evaluating ambient sound for
characteristic engine noises. This technology generally focuses on detecting the
acoustic wave frequencies formed by commonly-used UAS engines (Quantum
Technology Sciences, 2015). Quantum Technology acoustic detection systems use
advanced acoustic processing, allowing an operator to determine both the bearing
and the type of UAS threat, based on its unique signature (Quantum Technology
Sciences, 2015). Quantum Technology Sciences (2015) report the ability to
acoustically detect and track a UAS platform at up to 350 meters. A competing
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company, Drone Labs, claims their systems can detect a drone up to 100 feet away
in normal environments, and up to 300 feet away in quiet conditions (“It’s a bird,”
2015). While these systems show great promise, their application is likely to be
limited based on the ambient noises of the environment and may not be appropriate
for all security situations.
Thermal or infrared detection systems make use of the infrared radiation
spectrum, which utilizes slightly longer wavelengths then visible light. While both
systems use the infrared spectrum, what they detect is quite different. The near
wavelength infrared spectrum lies just beyond the visual EM spectrum, functions
characteristically similar to visible light, and is what some people would call night
vision (B. Lincoln, 2013). These systems are ideal for detecting UAS platforms in
low-light conditions. Conversely, long wavelength infrared utilizes lower infrared
frequencies that can differentiate thermal variances and is more commonly known
as thermal imaging (Light, n.d.). These systems detect the difference between the
ambient environmental temperature and the heat-producing parts of an unmanned
system, such as the engines (“UAVs,” 2015). Thermal infrared systems benefit
from high sensor contrast between a heat-producing target and relatively
homogeneous background (Koretsky, Nicoll, & Taylor, 2013).
The final method of passive detection of UAS craft involves the monitoring
of the EM spectrum typically associated with UAS control or communications
(Beaudoin et al, 2015). This form of signal detection provides an alert to UAS
control signal presence after which triangulation can be used to obtain signal
bearing information. Signal identification can be derived from comparing received
signals to a database of known UAS platform control signals that takes into account
signal frequency, modulation, and other factors to uniquely identify an electronic
fingerprint for the signal source—in this case, a UAS transmitter. This method of
UAS detection should be employed in concert with complementary active defenses
such as control interruption, spoofing, or jamming.
Rapid detection, identification, and tracking of UAS threats are critical to
establishing an effective threat response. Timely detection will allow maximum
opportunity to employ active defense measures against a threat UAS, permit rapid
evacuation, and execute pre-established emergency response plans.
Active defenses. Active defenses represent the final, layer of security
against UAS threats. It is important to note that not all UAS threats require an active
response. A risk management evaluation should be performed to assess the
potential UAS threat’s capabilities, available response time, mitigation alternatives,
and the potential for collateral damage caused by implementing an active defense
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measure. Active UAS defense measures come in two basic varieties: UAS
interruption or UAS destruction.
Interruption. Interruption defenses are active measures designed to avert a
threat UAS from carrying out an adverse action. Interruption can be carried out in
one of three ways: operator interruption, jamming, and spoofing. The most obvious
method of UAS interruption is to locate and identify the UAS operator and either
forcibly compel the operator’s compliance in removing the UAS threat or assuming
direct control of the UAS. Park rangers in Hawaii recently confronted a tourist
illegally operating a UAS near the Hawaii Volcanoes National Park caldera where
a large crowd had gathered (M. Lincoln, 2015). When confronted by the ranger, the
operator refused to provide identification and attempted to flee the scene, resulting
in the suspect being “tasered” by the ranger and subsequently arrested (M. Lincoln,
2015). This method of UAS interruption is highly unpredictable due to a number
of factors.
First, the operator may be uncooperative in complying with security
instructions in removing the UAS threat, such as a terroristic or criminal use of a
UAS. Secondly, detaining the operator may not prevent the threat UAS from
completing its assigned activity, as certain automated UAS systems can be
programmed to perform functions with little operator input. In the event the UAS
operators is uncooperative in redirecting, landing or removing the UAS threat,
security personnel may be required to take direct control of the UAS to avoid a
disaster. The lack of UAS control standardization, required specialized flying
experience, and other unpredictable complicating factors may make assuming
direct control of the threat UAS just as dangerous as allowing the operator to
continue the adverse action. It is difficult to provide recommendations in such a
circumstance, as an appropriate response would be dictated based on a multitude of
situational factors.
The second method of interrupting a threat UAS platform involves jamming
its control or navigation system. Jamming is the electronic bombardment of
frequency interference designed to drown out the UAS control system from
receiving transmitted control instructions or navigation information. With many
UAS platforms reliant on external navigation inputs from Global Positioning
System (GPS) satellites, jamming these frequencies may prevent the threat UAS
from precisely carrying out its operator-assigned task. This response method
presents its own unique risks and requires knowledge of the UAS type and specific
system capabilities to determine effectiveness. Some UAS platforms have inertial
navigation systems that supplement GPS navigation; these UAS systems would be
relatively unaffected and incur only degraded precision navigation performance.
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Other systems will merely perform a static hover until navigation connectivity is
restored or until the UAS power is depleted. Perhaps more importantly, the
jamming of navigation signals, particularly GPS, can adversely affect other
legitimate GPS systems within the jamming transmitter’s field of influence.
Succinctly, jamming operators must be cautious against inadvertently causing
collateral interference by interrupting other GPS-reliant systems in its proximity.
The jamming operator must also understand how the threat UAS will
respond to control frequency jamming. Some UAS aircraft will automatically
return to the launch point if the UAS loses control connectivity, whereas others will
carry out the last operator instructions. UAS response to jamming is highly variable
based on the UAS manufacturer and designed system capabilities.
The final method of UAS interruption is a form of deceptive jamming
known as spoofing. Defensive spoofing involves an operator sending falsified
navigation or control data to a threat UAS that mimics legitimate data. Spoofing
systems can divert a UAS threat away from the target area by feeding it false
coordinates or control instructions (Gettinger, 2015). Unencrypted control or
navigation systems are vulnerable to spoofing, since the UAS system has no way
to differentiate between authentic control signals verses the “spoofed” signals.
While system interruption provides an active defense against UAS threats,
these defense mechanisms are wrought with unknown risks. Jamming defense
measures should not be employed without a clear identification of the UAS
platform and a knowledge of expected system responses to lost navigation or
control links.
Destruction. Destructive defense measures are employed with the sole
purpose of eradicating a threat UAS platform. This defense mechanism can be
implemented using a wide variety of means including projectile weapons, directed
energy weapons, guided munitions, and interception. Destructive weapons should
be used as a last resort, as the airborne destruction of a UAS threat can potentially
cause collateral damage. In the event a threat UAS platform is damaged or
destroyed, collateral damage can be incurred by falling debris, falling weapon
projectiles, field of fire obstructions, scattered NBC elements (if equipped) and
other related factors. Gallagher (2013) agrees, citing, “Just shooting drones in a
crowded environment could cause more damage than the drones themselves” (p.
1).
Projectile weapons are perhaps the most obvious form of destructive
defense. Firearms can certainly damage or destroy a small UAS platform. Turkish
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police used firearms to destroy a small quadcopter overviewing protests in Istanbul
in 2013; and, in a posted video, the drone can be seen being struck by bullet and
falling to the ground (Estes, 2013). It is notable that during this shooting, the UAS
could be seen operating at low altitude. Furthermore, the video revealed tall
obstacles and buildings present in near proximity to the UAS, however, it is
unknown if the engagement caused any collateral damage.
In September 2014, a New Jersey man discharged a shotgun at an airborne
drone, which caused the operator to lose control (Back, 2014). A similar incident
occurred in Kentucky in July 2015, in which a homeowner used a shotgun to down
a drone flying at 250’ over his home (Chappell, 2015). In Gallagher (2015) Klaas
Jan de Kraker and Rob van de Wiel suggest, “Rapid fire guns with suitable
ammunition and machine guns are considered as very effective means for
neutralizing mini UAVs,” but add “hard kill systems could generate collateral
damage.” (p. 1). A possible projectile variant in lieu of firearms is the use of antihelicopter weapons that spread shrapnel or pointed projectiles such as flechettes
(Chuter, 2015).
Projectile weapons can increase lethality against small UAS systems when
a guidance system is added. So-called smart weapons allow for tracking systems to
provide updated telemetry, course correction, and detonation commands to the
projectile warhead (Prigg, 2015). The U.S. Army is currently testing a new system
dubbed the Extended Area Protection and Survivability Integrated Demonstration,
where a truck-mounted 50mm cannon fires a smart projectile carrying a directional
fragmentary-explosive (Prigg, 2015). The projectile would receive in-flight course
updates and detonation commands from mobile fire control computer (Prigg, 2015).
While guided surface-to-air weapons such as Patriot missiles, MANPADS, other
similar systems can theoretically be used against UAS systems, such systems are
largely impractical in urban environments (Gettinger, 2015).
De Kraker and van de Weil advocate directed energy weapons such as lasers
or microwave systems to destroy UAS threats, citing such systems yield a lower
risk to people and property than projectile weapons (Gallagher, 2013). Some
experts disagree, however, Chuter (2015) states, “Lasers are an expensive way of
solving the problem…part of the problem is that blowing up, or in the case of a
laser, burning, even a small UAV in urban areas or over critical infrastructure may
be unacceptable” (p. 1). According to Popular Mechanics (2009), lasers have
limited application against UAS threats, because lasers are susceptible to
atmospheric refraction, cloud cover, and must maintain contact with the platform
to overheat the targeted flight component. While this developmental technology
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minimizes the collateral damage caused by an errant projectile weapon, it fails to
eliminate the hazards caused by falling debris.
The final proposal in UAS threat destruction lies in the employment of
unmanned counter-UAS platforms. This methodology of UAS defense is still
largely speculative (Gettinger, 2015). Some suggested implementations of this
approach involve defending UAS platforms capturing threat UAS craft with nets or
other impediments (Gettinger, 2015). While this suggested defense is intriguing,
the development necessary to make it a reliable and pragmatic defense measure
make this little more than a hypothetical possibility at this point.
Conclusions
UAS Threats
UAS platforms can be used by terrorist or criminal elements for several
purposes. In their unmodified state, UAS platforms can create a public nuisance,
interfere with aircraft or airspace operations, collect information that can be utilized
for illicit purposes, and be employed as a kinetic weapons. As a transportation
device, a UAS device can be used to smuggle illegal substances into forbidden areas
by bypassing traditional security measures. Finally, UAS platforms can be
weaponized with non-lethal, projectile, improvised explosives, weapons of mass
destruction, or even commit digital attacks.
UAS technology represents a new tool that can be used for either good or
ill. While it is likely that most UAS platforms will be employed for legitimate and
productive purposes, one cannot ignore the potential for illicit exploitation of such
capabilities. The wide availability and low cost of UAS platforms make them an
attractive purchase for terrorists or criminals to add aerial capability to illicit
activities. Moreover, the use of unmanned systems adds a new layer of
complication in the investigative process, as automation and increased standoff
distances provide perpetrators a shield of anonymity. In the event of a plot failure,
this anonymity reduces the risk of capture, leaving terrorists or criminals "free to
strike another day."
The threat is real. Terrorists are adept at using new technology to their
advantage and purpose. UAS have been modified to carry explosives, automatic
weapons, and non-lethal weapons. Criminals have used UAS to further their
enterprises. The threat is not exaggerated or hyped. Homeland security and law
enforcement officials have taken notice of the real threats posed by UAS platforms.
The potential malicious uses of UAS platforms are limited only by the imagination
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of the user. The many documented incidents of terrorist and criminal uses of UAS
both domestically and abroad should be a red flag to officials to act and employ
mitigation strategies against this evolving threat.
Evaluation of UAS Defenses
An evaluation of the collected data suggest several methods of defending
against UAS threats. Measures such as export controls, critical component
monitoring, and intelligence collection efforts can preempt a UAS threat before it
can be employed. Similarly, deterrent efforts such as criminal penalties, civil torts,
law enforcement presence, or established no-fly zones can potentially dissuade
perpetrators from illicitly using UAS platforms. The use of random security
measures and careful selection of locations that includes natural or man-made
obstructions, can effectively deny UAS threat operations. The inclusion of geofencing protections in commercially-sold UAS platforms can also deny UAS
platforms from performing illicit operations in certain geographical areas. If
unimpeded by previous defense measures, rapid detection, identification and
tracking of the UAS threat is required to effectively employ active, counter-UAS
defenses. With modification, active sensor systems have shown promise in
detecting UAS threats. With additional development and testing, it is highly likely
that passive sensors will also become viable detectors for UAS threats. The final
defense against UAS threats include interruption or destruction of the UAS craft.
Interruption activities such as jamming, spoofing, or operator intervention are
possible, but increase the risk of creating unintentional or unanticipated side effects.
Alternatively, UAS threat destruction methods appear to be effective, however, are
likely to cause collateral damage, particularly in urban environments.
While it may be tempting to focus UAS defense efforts on the establishment
of new interruption or destructive systems, the most efficient and cost-effective
means of defense lie in prevention, deterrence, and denial. While entrepreneurial
efforts are currently underway to develop new technologies to detect, interrupt, or
destroy UAS platforms, the industry should not be so quick to dismiss existing
resources. A repurposing of existing technology such as radar and select passive
detection technology shows great promise in addressing the challenges of UAS
detection, identification, and tracking.
Similarly, a shotgun seems equally up to the task of engaging certain threat
UAS platforms as more expensive developmental weapon systems. The selection
and employment of defensive systems should be based on the threat UAS
capabilities, coupled with an evaluation of the risk, including risks to nonparticipating groups. While the myriad of traditional and novel UAS defenses have
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demonstrated the ability to negate an airborne UAS threat, aerial engagement may
not always be the most appropriate response. While the initial temptation may be
to immediately destroy a potential UAS threat, careful consideration must be given
to the potential for collateral damage caused both by the engaging weapon system
and falling UAS debris. In such cases, the consequences of an in appropriate
defensive response could create a more severe catastrophe than the offending UAS
platform.
Perhaps the greatest security lesson learned is that UAS technologies must
be included in the security assessments. The true threat lies not in what is known
about malicious UAS uses, but rather in what is unknown. UAS platforms represent
a novel and largely unpredictable threat with many potential asymmetric terroristic
and criminal applications. In the same manner that the 9/11 changed attitudes about
the potential threats of civil aviation, the misuse of unmanned systems has the
potential to cause similar catastrophic results. Until now, the security community
has been fortunate that recent newsworthy events caused by UAS platforms at the
Merkel campaign fundraiser, White House, and Japanese Prime Minister’s office
have all had relatively benign impact. Such situations must serve as a clear wakeup
call for the industry to acknowledge the security risks presented by UAS technology
and prepare defenses against illicit UAS applications. Security personnel must now
remain vigilant to the skies and keep UAS threats in their cross-check.
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